

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

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TO: The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

FROM: Chief of Police

SUBJECT: OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING, FID NO. 008-20 (ANIMAL)

Honorable Members:

The following is my review, analysis, and findings for Officer Involved Shooting (OIS), Force Investigation Division (FID) No. 008-20. On November 9, 2020, this case was presented to the Chair of the Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB). I have reviewed and adopted the recommendations from the Chair of the UOFRB for this incident. I hereby submit my findings in accordance with Police Commission policy.

SUMMARY¹

According to the FID investigation, on March 8, 2020, at approximately 1130 hours, witness M. Zeledon was working at his son's duplex located at 10618-10620 Wilmington Avenue. Zeledon finished working on the property and was seated in his vehicle, which was parked in the rear parking area, on the east side of the property. Zeledon observed two dogs barking at him and described one dog as *brown* and the other dog as *white and black*. Zeledon yelled at the dogs to go back to their own yard at 10616 Wilmington Avenue, but was unsuccessful, so he called out to the residents inside 10618 Wilmington Avenue to call the police.

Note: The City of Los Angeles Department of Animal Services described the brown dog as a male, brown brindle, mixed breed, approximately two years of age and approximately 50 pounds. The white dog was described as a female, white, mixed breed dog, approximately two years of age and approximately 45 pounds.

According to witness G. Alcala,² he was inside the kitchen of his residence at 10618 Wilmington Avenue, when he heard *dogs barking super loud and chains dragging in the backyard*. Guillermo exited his front door and walked east along the north side of the structure towards the sound.

¹ The summary and the investigation completed by FID for this incident have been provided to the Board of Police Commissioners.

² For purposes of clarity, G. Alcala will be referred to by his first name "Guillermo" throughout the remainder of this report.

According to the FID investigation, Zeledon and Guillermo recognized that the two dogs belonged to the neighbor adjacent to them at 10616 Wilmington Avenue and believed the dogs escaped by accessing a space underneath the chain link fence between the two properties. The two dogs continued to bark at Zeledon who remained inside of his vehicle. The dogs turned their attention towards Guillermo and ran towards him. Guillermo backpedaled towards his front door as the brown dog barked, lunged at Guillermo, and attempted to bite Guillermo's lower left leg; however, Guillermo was not bitten and fled inside of his residence. Once safely inside his residence, Guillermo instructed his mother, M. Guadalupe Conchola, to call 9-1-1.³ The two dogs retreated to the rear of the location and remained there until the arrival of police officers.

According to Guillermo, he *started backing* away from the dogs as the *brown dog drew his attention* towards Guillermo and Guillermo's *reaction* was to *get the kids inside*.⁴ Guillermo stated the brown dog *almost bit* his *left leg*.

According to the FID investigation, when the dogs focused their attention towards Guillermo, Zeledon exited his vehicle and fled west along the south side of the structure to the front sidewalk. Zeledon attempted to make contact with the dogs' owner at 10616 Wilmington Avenue, but there was no answer.

Officers W. Chamu, Serial No. 43036 and K. Love El, Serial No. 43698, Southeast (SOE) Patrol Division, assigned Unit 18A49, were in full uniform and driving a marked black and white police vehicle when they were assigned the following radio call from Communications Division (CD): "Any Southeast unit, vicious animal, 10618 Wilmington Avenue, in the front yard of the apartment complex. Three loose pit bull dogs roaming around. Number one is brown, two light brown, and three, white. Not allowing anyone to enter the property, aggressive toward passersby. The dog owners do not appear to be at the location. Code 2. Incident 2028. RD 1838."⁵

According to the FID investigation, this was Officers Chamu and Love El's first day working together. Officers Chamu and Love El discussed the equipment they carried, as well as contact and cover responsibilities at the beginning of their watch (**Debriefing Point No. 1 – Required Equipment (Taser) and Additional/Equipment – Required Equipment**).⁶

According to Officer Chamu, while responding to the call, she read the comments of the radio call to Officer Love El and *informed* Officer Love El *it was a few vicious dogs in a yard* and "the dogs were inside of a yard and they weren't out." Based off the comments of the radio call, Officer Chamu advised Officer Love El that, "It's probably a neighbor that has an issue with dogs being in a mutual area." Officer Chamu believed the dogs were contained in the yard, and

³ According to the FID investigation, in Conchola's 9-1-1 call with the operator, Conchola did not mention that the dogs had attempted to bite Zeledon or Guillermo.

⁴ According to the FID investigation, Guillermo declined to have his children interviewed.

⁵ The FID investigation determined there were only two dogs in the yard at the time of the incident.

⁶ The FID investigation revealed that Officer Love El was not equipped with a Taser at the time of the incident. Officer Chamu was not equipped with her baton at the time of the incident. Officers Chamu and Love El were not equipped with their Hobble Restraint Devices (HRD) at the time of the incident.

she believed the dogs resided at 10618 Wilmington Avenue; therefore, Officers Chamu and Love El did not *bring out any fire extinguisher* and did not *think of using any pepper spray* because the dogs were not *out in the street*. Officer Chamu stated the *best option* was to have the *residents actually make contact with the dogs* to keep *everyone safe* because Officer Chamu did not like to *remove dogs from their houses*. Officer Chamu did not want *animal regulations* to become involved because Officer Chamu believed they would remove the dogs and Officer Chamu did not want to *break the bond* between the two dogs (**Debriefing Point No. 2 – Dog Encounters**).

According to the FID investigation, Officer Chamu did not verbalize to Officer Love El her intention to have the dogs' owner remove the dogs from the neighbor's property (**Debriefing Point No. 3 – Tactical Planning/Tactical Communication**).

According to the FID investigation, Officer Chamu broadcast to CD they were Code-Six and Officer Love El parked their police vehicle south of the location, on the east side of Wilmington Avenue.⁷ Officers Chamu and Love El walked north along the east sidewalk of Wilmington Avenue and met with Zeledon on the sidewalk in front of 10618 Wilmington Avenue.⁸ When Officers Chamu and Love El initially met with Zeledon, the dogs were not yet visible in the yard. Zeledon spoke to Officer Chamu in Spanish and advised Officer Chamu that the dogs were on the other side of the fence, did not belong on the property, and were vicious.⁹ Officer Chamu believed Zeledon was upset that the neighbors had not contained the dogs and allowed the dogs to escape through the fence. In addition, witness I. Alcala¹⁰ was standing on the sidewalk just north of Zeledon and advised Officer Chamu that the dogs had previously attacked one of his sons [**Additional/Equipment – Body Worn Video (BWV) Activation**].¹¹

Note: According to the FID investigation, the officers' BWV captured Officer Chamu informing Officer Love El that the dogs resided at another residence; however, Officer Chamu did not advise Officer Love El that the dogs were vicious or had attacked anyone.

According to the FID investigation, Officer Love El did not initially observe any dogs on the premises. Officers Chamu and Love El stood on the sidewalk in front of the wrought iron gate, at the entrance of the driveway, near the southwest portion of the property. Officer Love El wanted to verify if the dogs were on the premises, so she removed her baton and ran the end of the baton back and forth against the fence, creating a loud noise. As Officer Love El did so, a brown dog, with an approximate four-foot chain attached to its collar, and a white dog emerged from the north side of the property, barking and running towards the officers. The dogs stopped in front of the fence on the opposite side of Officers Love El and Chamu, barked at the officers, and ran back towards the residence.

⁷ Due to the officers Code Two response, their DICVS was not activated.

⁸ According to the FID investigation, the location was a duplex residence, with an approximate six-foot-high wrought iron fence running along the west side of the property near the sidewalk.

⁹ According to the FID investigation, Officer Chamu was a Department-certified Spanish speaker and Officer Love El did not speak Spanish.

¹⁰ For purposes of clarity, I. Alcala will be referred to by his first name "Ignacio" throughout the remainder of this report.

¹¹ According to the FID investigation, Ignacio's statement was captured on Officer Chamu's BWV at approximately 1209:10 hours.

According to Officer Love El, she ran the end of her baton *across* the fence to get the dogs' attention and determine *whether or not the dogs were still there*. Officer Love El recalled Zeledon state to her in English, "These dogs are crazy," and "Oh, Oh, be careful. These dogs are vicious," as she observed Officer Chamu put her hand up towards the dogs to see if the dogs were *friendly* (**Additional/Equipment – Profanity**).

According to the FID investigation, Officer Chamu's BWV captured Officer Love El asking Zeledon, in English, if the dogs bite. Officer Chamu then asked in Spanish if the dogs bite and Zeledon nodded his head up and down.

Note: According to Officer Love El, Zeledon said *something like indecisively*. Officer Love El did not recall Zeledon stating "yes" or "no."

According to the FID investigation, Officer Chamu believed the dogs were contained in the yard, initially appeared happy, and were just being territorial because the dogs lived there. Officer Chamu indicated that her experience with past radio calls was most times after a dog smelled her, the dog would calm down. In an attempt to get the dogs attention, Officer Chamu placed her right hand between the rods of the fence and began talking and making noises.

According to Officer Chamu, she and Officer Love El attempted to *keep visual* of the dogs *by making noise and trying to keep* the dogs in an area where Officers Love El and Chamu could see the dogs and observed that they were *not attacking anyone else*. Officer Chamu stated the dogs were *prancing around and seemed pretty happy*. Officer Chamu further stated the dogs looked *comfortable* as if the dogs were *used to being there*. Officer Chamu had experience with *pit bulls* and was aware that *they get very territorial*. Upon making contact with the dogs, Officer Chamu stated the dogs *did appear* that they might *have been upset*. Officer Chamu placed her arm over so that the *dog could smell her and mellow down*.

According to the FID investigation, Officer Love El asked Zeledon in English if he had contacted the owner of the dogs, and her BWV captured Zeledon telling Officer Love El that no one was home. Zeledon then walked north on the sidewalk, followed by Officers Chamu and Love El. Zeledon stopped on the sidewalk in front of 10616 Wilmington Avenue.

According to Officer Love El, based on the actions of Zeledon and Officer Chamu, Officer Love El assumed they were walking north on the sidewalk to *talk to the neighbors* that were located *just north of the property*. Officer Love El also believed Zeledon *wanted to go home* but could not *because the dogs were in there*.

According to the FID investigation, Zeledon was aware of gaps in the wrought iron fencing to the east of the sidewalk as he walked north; however, he did not inform Officers Chamu or Love El of the gaps. The FID investigation determined there were two missing fence rods creating two individual gaps, separated by a single rod. The gaps each measured approximately nine inches wide. As Officer Chamu walked north, she began to call the dogs to her, stopping in front of the gaps in the fence. Both dogs walked up to the gaps in the fence where Officer Chamu had stopped, and the brown dog began to bark at Officer Chamu while still inside the

yard. Officer Chamu then raised her right arm and placed it near the fence as the brown dog put his nose through the gap.

According to Officer Chamu, she observed a few gaps in the fence that were *wider than the other*, but she believed the dogs would not *actually exit*. Officer Chamu believed the dogs *wanted to stay* in the yard and did not *want people to get* into the yard.

Note: According to the FID investigation, Officer Chamu did not alert Officer Love El when she observed the gaps in the fence.

According to Officer Love El, she observed Officer Chamu stop in front of the iron fence where it appeared that the *pole of the iron fence might be missing* and observed Officer Chamu put her hand near the fence. Officer Love El stopped walking and stated to Officer Chamu, "Girl, looks like they might be able to get out!"

According to the FID investigation, Officer Chamu's BWV captured Officer Chamu's response to Officer Love El stating, "I'm trying to get the chain." The brown dog stopped barking and momentarily stepped back from the fence before both dogs exited through the gaps onto the sidewalk toward Officer Chamu. To avoid being bitten, Officer Chamu backed away from the dogs in a northwest direction into the parkway. The white dog began to bark and lunged towards Officer Chamu, attempting to bite Officer Chamu's right hand. The brown dog lunged towards Officer Chamu, biting her on the left leg. Officer Chamu continued to walk backward to create distance between herself and the dogs, but the dogs continued to charge at Officer Chamu. Officer Chamu's BWV captured the white dog opening its mouth and again, attempt to bite Officer Chamu's right hand, but was unsuccessful. After this attempt, the white dog stopped moving towards Officer Chamu and moved back towards the iron fence. Officer Chamu continued backpedaling south, away from the dogs, while the brown dog continued to lung towards her. Officer Chamu unholstered her service pistol with her right hand and pointed the muzzle downward toward the brown dog.

According to Officer Chamu, when both dogs exited the fence and charged her, she backed away from the dogs *approximately three to four steps* onto the *dirt* parkway. The white dog began to bark and *jumped up*, attempting to bite Officer Chamu's right hand, but according to Officer Chamu, "it didn't really catch my hand." Officer Chamu attempted to *shoo them away*, but the brown dog *approached on her left side, jumped, and grabbed ahold of* Officer Chamu, biting her left leg. Officer Chamu described the bite as "He kind of bit and let go." Officer Chamu stated she *realized the dogs were trying to attack* her. Officer Chamu *drew out* her firearm and *aimed* down towards the *dog's face* because she believed if she did not *shoot at the dog*, the dog would *tear a piece of her body away* (**Drawing/Exhibiting – Officer Chamu, First Occurrence**).

Note: According to the FID investigation, FID investigators inspected Officer Chamu's wrists and hands and did not observe any visible injuries.

According to the FID investigation, the brown dog jumped towards Officer Chamu and bit Officer Chamu's left leg again. Officer Chamu extended her right arm downward, aimed at the

face of the brown dog, and discharged one round from a one-handed shooting position. Regarding her decision to shoot, Officer Chamu stated, "If I did not discharge my firearm, that dog would have definitely chunked a piece of my leg off." Officer Chamu assessed that the round appeared to have missed the brown dog and struck the ground.

According to Officer Chamu, she felt another bite and discharged one round at the brown dog on her left-hand side because Officer Chamu believed that the dog *would bite her leg off and bite off an artery*. Officer Chamu stated that she believed she would *be bleeding out right now*. Officer Chamu believed that she would have been *getting stitches at the very minimum*. Officer Chamu aimed towards the *short brown dog's* face and decided she was not going to *take the time* to aim for the dog's *chest* or *leg* because the dog had *jumped* at her *twice*. After Officer Chamu discharged a round, both dogs backed away (**Lethal Use of Force**).¹²

Note: The FID investigation revealed that Officer Chamu was bitten twice on the front of her left leg just below her knee. In addition, Officer Chamu's round did not strike the brown dog, but instead struck the dirt parkway to the left of the dog.¹³

According to Officer Love El, she observed Officer Chamu *start to back-up* and the *brown dog* came out. Officer Love El stated *both* she and Officer Love El were redeploying. Officer Love El believed that she could attempt to *administer baton strikes*, but the dogs *kept coming*. The dogs appeared to be *escalating*. Officer Love El decided to *redeploy and grab her gun* because she believed the situation was *imminent* and did not want the dogs to *bite* Officer Chamu. Officer Love El transitioned her baton from her *left hand* to her *right hand* and attempted to *ring* her baton; however, she was unsuccessful. Unable to secure her baton, Officer Love El *dropped* her baton to the ground (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Retention of Equipment**).

According to the FID investigation, Officer Love El believed the situation could escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified and unholstered her service pistol with her left hand, which Officer Love El held in a two-handed grip. Officer Love El estimated she was approximately six to eight feet from Officer Chamu. Officer Love El placed her finger on the trigger and aimed her sights at the head of the brown dog, which Officer Love El estimated to be approximately one foot away from Officer Chamu. Officer Love El repeatedly placed her finger on and off the trigger as she continually assessed her ability to safely discharge her service pistol. Although the brown dog was in close proximity to Officer Chamu, Officer Love El did not believe she covered Officer Chamu with her service pistol. Officer Love El heard Officer Chamu's gunshot and observed the brown dog back away from Officer Chamu.

According to Officer Love El, she unholstered her service pistol because she was *ready to fire* at the dogs and believed *the situation* had *gotten to the point* where *deadly force may be justified*. Officer Love El heard Officer Chamu give commands to the dogs stating "Get back." Officer

¹² According to Officer Chamu, she believed she held her service pistol in a two-handed grip; however, her BWV captured her place her left hand on the service pistol after the OIS.

¹³ The investigation determined that approximately six seconds elapsed from the time both dogs exited from the gaps in the fence to the time of the OIS.

Love El observed the dog *jumping* up and Officer Chamu kicking. Officer Love El stated she did not want to *shoot* Officer Chamu's leg or foot but did not want the dogs to *puncture* or *defame* Officer Chamu. Officer Love El believed she *had a good* shot, but assessed the dog was *too* close to Officer Chamu. Officer Love El *heard* Officer Chamu's shot and observed the dogs *run northbound*. The dogs *lingered* and then went *back in the gate* [(Drawing/Exhibiting – Officer Love El and Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Situational Awareness (Safety of Civilians))].

According to the FID investigation, both dogs appeared stunned, retreated north on the sidewalk along the fence line, and momentarily stopped near the property line of 10616 Wilmington Avenue until both dogs reentered the yard. Officer Chamu lowered her service pistol to a one-handed low ready position and removed her radio with her left hand. Officer Chamu stood on the sidewalk, just south of the gaps in the fence, and broadcast "Shots fired. Officer needs help. 10615 Wilmington Avenue" (Additional/Equipment – Communications Division Radio Broadcast Protocols).

According to the FID investigation, Officer Chamu's BWV captured her advising Officer Love El they should get behind cover. Officer Chamu walked south and picked up Officer Love El's baton with her left hand as Officer Chamu held her service pistol in her right hand. Officer Love El holstered her service pistol and accepted her baton back from Officer Chamu. Officer Love El's BWV captured Officer Chamu briefly holster her service pistol after picking up the baton. However, the dogs began to bark and appeared to move toward the fence and Officer Chamu can be seen unholstering again. Officers Chamu and Love El walked south toward their police vehicle. Officer Chamu held her service pistol in her right hand along her leg and pointed downward while she and Officer Love El continued to walk south toward their police vehicle (Drawing/Exhibiting – Officer Chamu, Second Occurrence).¹⁴

Note: Officer Chamu did not recall holstering and unholstering her service pistol a second time during this incident.

According to Officer Chamu, she stated to Officer Love El, "Let's stop making contact with the dogs..." Officer Chamu and Officer El Love moved *south* approximately *10 feet* to their police vehicle because it was the *only decent cover* away from the dogs. Officer Chamu *opened up* the passenger side door of the police vehicle *to get some cover*. Officer Chamu *holstered* her service pistol when the *other units* started to arrive.

According to Officer Love El, Officer Chamu stated, "Let's not engage the dogs anymore." Officers Love El and Chamu advised Zeledon to *get back*. Officers Love El and Chamu *redeployed* to the point where they were *no longer in sight* of the dogs, towards their police vehicle. Officer Love El stated she *holstered* her service pistol approximately *two minutes* after the OIS occurred.

¹⁴ According to the FID investigation, Officer Love El believed she did not holster her service pistol until approximately two minutes after Officer Chamu discharged her service pistol and after responding units arrived.

According to the FID investigation, as Officers Chamu and Love El waited for responding units to arrive, Officer Chamu broadcast a request for the Department of Animal Services to respond. Officer Love El requested a Rescue Ambulance (RA) for Officer Chamu after Officer Love El verified that Officer Chamu was bitten. Officer Love El also requested a supervisor and an additional unit.

According to the FID investigation, Officers J. Roberts, Serial No. 41448, and J. Jimenez, Serial No. 44147, Southeast Patrol Division, Unit 18A97, arrived at the location and began to secure the gaps in the fence utilizing various objects that they located in the area and secured the items with crime scene tape against the fence. Sergeant C. Giargiari, Serial No. 34277, Southeast Patrol Division, Unit 18L70, was the first supervisor to arrive at scene and identified himself as the Incident Commander. Upon arrival, Sergeant Giargiari identified Officers Chamu and Love El as being involved in the incident. Sergeant Giargiari monitored Officer Love El while also managing the scene. Additional Southeast Patrol Division uniformed personnel arrived and established a perimeter around the property to ensure the dogs could not exit. The officers continued to monitor and contain the dogs in the property until the arrival of Department of Animal Services (**Additional/Equipment – Protocols Subsequent to a Categorical Use of Force**).

Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) Firefighters/Paramedics Reynoso and Hershey assessed Officer Chamu and determined that Officer Chamu needed further medical treatment. LAFD transported Officer Chamu to Martin Luther King Jr. Community Hospital. Officer Chamu was treated by Doctor S. Covington for two dog bites Officer Chamu sustained to her left knee.

Sergeant Giargiari informed Sergeant J. Cohen, Serial No. 38352, Acting Watch Commander, Southeast Patrol Division, that Officer Chamu was transported to the hospital and a supervisor needed to meet Officer Chamu there. Sergeant Cohen requested a 77th Street Patrol Division supervisor respond to the hospital to monitor Officer Chamu.¹⁵

Sergeant T. Baumann, Serial No. 30540, 77th Street Patrol Division, responded to the hospital and transported Officer Chamu to Southeast Community Police Station (CPS) (**Additional/Equipment – Sergeant's Daily Report**).

Sergeant S. Hale, Serial No. 30704, Watch Commander, Southeast Patrol Division, arrived at the scene. Sergeant Hale obtained a Public Safety Statements (PSS) from Officer Love El and admonished Officer Love El not to speak about the incident.

Sergeant Cohen obtained a PSS from Officer Chamu when Officer Chamu arrived at Southeast CPS.

¹⁵ According to the FID investigation, Sergeant Giargiari was the only Patrol Supervisor in Southeast Patrol Division at the time of the incident.

Sergeant H. Taylor, Serial No. 36463, Southeast Patrol Division, transported Officer Chamu to the OIS scene and returned Officer Chamu to Southeast CPS (**Additional/Equipment – Sergeant’s Daily Report**).

FINDINGS

Tactics – Administrative Disapproval, Officers Chamu and Love El

Drawing/Exhibiting – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Chamu and Love El

Lethal Use of Force – Out of Policy, Administrative Disapproval, Officer Chamu

ANALYSIS¹⁶

Detention

Does Not Apply.

Tactics

Department policy relative to a Tactical Debrief is: *“The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance.”*

Department policy relative to Administrative Disapproval is: *“A finding, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that the tactics employed during a CUOF incident unjustifiably and substantially deviated from approved Department tactical training”* (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05).

The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

Tactical De-Escalation

Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.

¹⁶ The analysis reflects my recommendations as supported by the preponderance of the evidence established by the investigation.

Tactical De-Escalation Techniques

- *Planning*
- *Assessment*
- *Time*
- *Redeployment and/or Containment*
- *Other Resources*
- *Lines of Communication (Use of Force - Tactics Directive No. 16, October 2016, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques)*

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.

Planning – According to Officers Chamu and Love El, the day of this incident was their first time working together. At the beginning of their watch, Officers Chamu and Love El discussed the equipment they carry, contact and cover responsibilities, and the types of incidents they like to handle. Officers Chamu and Love El believed that, based off the comments of the radio call, the dogs appeared to be contained in the yard. Officers Chamu's plan was to make contact with the dogs' owner and have the owner remove the dogs from the neighbor's property. Officers Chamu and Love El did not believe a fire extinguisher or other tools would be needed. Upon arrival to the location, Officers Chamu and Love El met with Zeledon, who was a Spanish speaker. Zeledon conversed with Officer Chamu in Spanish and advised her that the dogs were vicious, and they resided at an adjacent residence. Officer Chamu did not advise Officer Love El that the dogs were vicious or had attacked anyone.

Officers Chamu and Love El did not discuss a tactical plan or communicate a plan on how they would handle the dogs; however, Officer Love El took it upon herself to remove her baton and run it along the iron fence to verify if the dogs were still there. As Zeledon walked north on the sidewalk, Officers Chamu and Love El followed Zeledon, assuming Zeledon was going to contact the dogs' owner, but this was not communicated between the officers. Upon passing the fence gaps, Officer Chamu stopped and reached her hand out towards the dogs as they stood on the opposite side of the fence, next to the gaps in the fence. Officers Chamu and Love El failed to communicate a plan between each other on how they would proceed. Officer Chamu did not communicate her intention to grab the brown dog's chain to Officer Love El when reaching her hand out towards the dogs on the other side of the fence.

Officer Love El noted the gaps in the fence and warned Officer Chamu that the dogs might be able to exit from the opening. As both dogs exited and lunged towards Officer Chamu, the officers did not communicate their intentions or a plan to stop the dogs' actions.

The Chair of the UOFRB concluded, and I concur, that while this incident was the first time Officers Chamu and Love El had worked together as partners, each radio call and patrol situation merits its own discussion and individual plan on how to best address the incident. The officers' plan lacked depth and detail when confronted by aggressive dogs and controlling the scene. The

Chair of the UOFRB noted that a proper plan included being in possession of all equipment necessary to accomplish a task. Officers Chamu and Love El's lack of required equipment limited their planning and accessibility to their baton and Taser, which may have proven effective against the dogs' actions and provided additional force options in dealing with the incident. I would have preferred Officers Chamu and Love El been in possession of their required patrol equipment and had developed a more robust plan prior to arriving to this incident.

Assessment – When Officers' Chamu and Love El arrived on scene, they parked their police vehicle south of the location. The officers approached the location and made contact on the sidewalk with Zeledon and Ignacio. Officers Chamu and Love El did not observe any dogs at the location. Zeledon advised Officer Chamu that the dogs were located on the other side of the fence in the yard. Zeledon further advised Officer Chamu that the dogs were vicious and did not belong on the property. Officer Chamu also spoke to Ignacio, who advised her the dogs had attacked Guillermo in the past. Officer Chamu, who is Spanish speaking, did not translate all the pertinent details to Officer Love El, who is not Spanish speaking.

Officer Love El wanted to verify if the dogs were on the premises, so she removed her baton and ran the end of the baton back and forth against the iron fence, creating a loud noise. A white dog and brown dog, with an approximate four-foot chain attached to its collar, emerged from the north side of the residence and ran towards the front fence, barking.

Officer Chamu perceived that the dogs were contained in the yard, appeared "happy," and opined that the dogs were behaving territorial because they lived at the location, despite the information that had been provided by Zeledon, which according to Officer Chamu, Zeledon described the dogs as being "vicious." Officers Chamu and Love El did not treat the dogs as a threat although the information provided by Zeledon and Ignacio described the dogs as being vicious and having previously attempted to attack them. Despite the concerns communicated by Zeledon and Ignacio, Officer Love El again ran her baton along the fence, and Officer Chamu placed her right hand between the gaps in the fence, talking to the dogs and making noises.

As Zeledon walked north on the sidewalk, Officer Chamu observed a few of the iron rods of the fence were missing, creating a wider than normal space between them, but did not communicate this information. Officer Chamu assessed that the dogs would not exit the property because the dogs had not exited when Zeledon passed the gaps in the fence. Officer Love El noted the opening in the fence and warned Officer Chamu that the dogs might be able to exit. As the dogs emerged from the opening of the fence and lunged towards Officer Chamu, Officer Chamu recognized that the dogs were a threat, had bit her, and were continuing to attempt to bite her.

Upon discharging her service pistol, Officer Chamu assessed that her fired round had startled the dogs causing them to move away from her. Officer Chamu assessed that the dogs had re-entered the yard, advised Officer Love El to no longer attempt to contact the dogs, and to move to cover.

The Chair of the UOFRB concluded, and I concur, that Officers Chamu and Love El made multiple observations and assessments throughout the incident that indicated the dogs could be a threat to them; however, they disregarded those assessments, beginning with the comments of

the radio call. Officers Chamu and Love El's actions intensified the situation and Officer Chamu placed herself in an unsafe location next to the opening in the fence.

Time – Officers Chamu and Love El responded to the Code Two radio call and arrived approximately 30 minutes after the radio call was generated. While enroute to the call, Officers Chamu and Love El discussed the comments of the call and assumed the dogs resided at the location and were contained in the yard. As there was no exigency, Officers Chamu and Love El were afforded with time while enroute to the radio call to create a more robust tactical plan. Additionally, the officers had time while interviewing witnesses to verify the information and elicit additional information which could assist Officers Love El and Chamu in developing a plan and taking action with respect to the dogs. Officer Love El removed her baton and ran it along the iron fence to get the dogs' attention and verify they were still present in the yard; however, upon doing so, Officer Love El and Chamu continued to create noise to entice the dogs to the fence, which by Officer Chamu's account, the dogs appeared upset.

Once the dogs exited the fence and Officer Chamu identified them as a threat. Officer Chamu attempted to redeploy by utilizing distance to afford her additional time to manage the threat and Officer Love El walked backwards northbound; however, the dogs lunged towards Officer Chamu reducing the distance and time Officer Chamu had to redeploy to safety and consider other tactical options.

The Chair of the UOFRB concluded that Officer Chamu and Love El did not have any exigency in making contact with the dogs and were afforded with time to develop a detailed and comprehensive tactical plan. Officers Chamu and Love El's actions further intensified the situation, causing the incident to quickly escalate. I would have preferred that Officers Chamu and Love El utilize their time to have properly equipped themselves, formulated a solid tactical plan, requested additional resources, and maintained communication with each other.

Redeployment and/or Containment – When Officers Chamu and Love El arrived at the scene and met with Zeledon and Ignacio, the dogs were not visible and were contained in the yard. The dogs had not exited the opening of the front fence prior to Officer Chamu stopping at the opening of the fence and reaching out to the dogs. When the dogs exited the opening of the fence and lunged towards Officer Chamu, Officer Chamu backed away from the dogs to create distance while continuing to assess and face the threat. Officer Love El began walking backwards and away upon seeing the dogs exit the fence.

The Chair of the UOFRB noted that upon Officers Chamu and Love El's arrival, the dogs were contained in the yard and did not appear to be attempting to harm anyone at that time. Officer Love El's actions of running her baton along the fence to verify if the dogs were at the location, and then continue to run her baton along the fence after observing the dogs, may have further agitated the dogs. Officer Chamu placed herself in an unsafe location next to the opening of the fence. Officer Chamu believed that her prior experience with similar radio calls and assumption that the dogs would not exit if given an opportunity, afforded her safety. Officer Chamu's actions limited her time to react and redeploy to a safer location once the dogs exited. The Chair of the UOFRB was critical of Officer Chamu's decision to stop in front of the fence opening and

place her hand towards the dogs through the fence opening rather than redeploy to a safer location. I would have preferred that Officer Chamu communicated her intentions with Officer Love El, recognized the potential threat created with the fence opening, and both officers had redeployed to deal with the threat as a coordinated team. In addition, I would have preferred that Officers Chamu and Love El contact the Department of Animal Services, who are better prepared to deal with such incidents, and have them make contact with the dogs once Officers Chamu and Love El verified that the safety of community members had not been compromised.

Other Resources – While responding to the radio call location, Officers Chamu and Love El did not utilize other available tools at their disposal to manage the dogs due their assumption the dogs were contained in a yard. Officers Chamu and Love El proceeded to investigate the radio call without all of their required equipment. Officer Chamu and Love El's complacency prior to arriving at the scene and at the time of their initial investigation, allowed them to believe that additional equipment and resources would not be needed. Without a tactical plan, Officers Chamu and Love El did not discuss or request additional resources to assist them with the incident and took it upon themselves to handle the situation, disregarding the guidelines outlined in the Use of Force - Tactics Directive for Dog Encounters.

The Chair of the UOFRB noted that Officers Chamu and Love El's lack of a tactical plan, lack of adherence to the guidelines within the Tactics Directive regarding Dog Encounters, and not having their required equipment, highlighted their complacency during this incident and I concur. I would have preferred Officers Chamu and Love El had their required equipment on them, utilized the tools at their disposal, and requested other resources as additional options to de-escalate a situation.

Lines of Communication – Upon arrival at the location, Officer Chamu conversed with Zeledon in Spanish; however, she did not relay the pertinent information to Officer Love El, who did not speak Spanish. Information with regard to the incident, such as the dogs had previously attacked a neighbor and were vicious, was not relayed to Officer Love El. Neither of the officers discussed a plan after speaking with the witnesses and verifying the dogs were still present at the location. The officers made assumptions, rather than have a discussion as to how they were going to proceed with handling the radio call.

Officer Chamu broadcast an "Officer needs help, shots fired" call after discharging her weapon and further broadcast the OIS involved an animal. Officer Chamu also requested the response of the Department of Animal Services. Officer Love El requested a supervisor, recognizing the incident had escalated, and requested an RA for Officer Chamu after verifying Officer Chamu had been bitten and required medical treatment. Officers Chamu and Love El advised Zeledon to move to a safer location after the OIS concluded.

Upon the arrival of additional officers, Officers Love El and Chamu warned the other officers regarding the gap in the fence.

The Chair of the UOFRB noted that although Officers Chamu and Love El made the appropriate notifications and requests after the incident occurred, the officers did not communicate a specific

tactical plan with each other with regard to this radio call and had little communication between each other during the incident. The Chair of the UOFRB was critical of Officers Chamu and Love El's lack of communication among each other as the dogs emerged and presented themselves as a threat and I concur. This deficiency in communication led to Officers Chamu and Love El facing a serious threat without preparedness and discussion, limiting their ability to deal with the threat the dogs presented.

During the review of the incident, the following Debriefing Topics were noted:

Debriefing Point No. 1 Required Equipment – Taser (Substantial Deviation, without justification – Officer Love El)

All on-duty uniformed officers, who are deployed to the field and trained to operate an Electronic Control Device, shall carry a TASER X26P on their person, utilizing a Department-approved holster, unless either is unavailable (Office of Operations, Operations Order No. 4, TASER X26P Deployment – Established, September 21, 2015).

The FID investigation revealed that Officer Love El was not equipped with a Taser on her person at the time of the incident. Officer Love El was not personally assigned a Taser¹⁷ and according to the Kitroom Inventory Tracking System (KITS) for that date, Officer Love El did not check out a Taser from the Kitroom. Southeast Area conducted an audit on the availability of Tasers for check out by personnel on the morning of March 8, 2020 (date of the incident) and concluded there were seven Tasers available to Officer Love El to check out from the Southeast Area Kitroom.¹⁸

In this case, Officer Love El was not equipped with a Taser and did not check out a Taser from Southeast Area's Kitroom, which limited the available force options to Officer Love El when she and Officer Chamu were confronted by the dogs and during any other field operations.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Chair of the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officer Love El's lack of having a Taser on her person was a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that these issues be topics of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Note: It is the Department's expectation and policy that officers working a uniform assignment be equipped with a Taser on their person. As a result, Southeast Area has initiated a personnel complaint for Officer Love El's failure to adhere to Department policy as required. The Commanding Officer of Operations – South Bureau and the Director of the Office of Operations concurred with this action.

¹⁷ Officer Love El was a probationary police officer at Southeast Area. Southeast Area does not permanently issue probationary police officers a Taser due to lack of inventory.

¹⁸A Kitroom is a designated room which serves as a storage and distribution center for equipment to Department personnel.

Debriefing Point No. 2

Dog Encounters (Substantial Deviation, without justification – Officers Chamu and Love El)

An officer's main concern upon arriving at the scene of a call is safety.

The sight of a uniform may agitate a dog. If officers must approach, be aware the dog may view this as an aggressive action or encroachment and become hostile. Dogs tend to regard their owner's property as their territory and may defend it by growling, barking, or assuming aggressive body language.

Dogs communicate through body language. Observe the dog's demeanor for change. Facial expression, ear posture, tail carriage, hackle (hair on back) display, and body stance signal a dog's state of fear, excitement, aggression or submission. Signs of potential hostility in a dog include bared teeth, flattened ears, erect tail, stiff legs, and bristling back hair.

Officers should try to avoid using community members, especially children, to assist in containing or controlling the dog when they know it is vicious or poses a threat.

Officers confronted by a hostile dog should remain still, face the animal, and employ the following tactics should the dog advance:

- *Voice Commands*
- *Oleoresin Capsicum Spray (OC)*
- *Baton*
- *Fire Extinguishers*
- *TASER*
- *Beanbag Shotgun*
- *Kicks*
- *Lethal Force*

Unexpected confrontations with a dog require officers to be aware of their surroundings and be prepared to act quickly and appropriately to a dog's approach. There is no single tool that is the ideal solution. Generally, the use of voice commands will calm most dogs. In addition, the use of OC spray, a baton, or fire extinguisher can be effective on aggressive dogs. By remaining alert and using common sense, officers can avoid most hostile dog injuries (LAPD Use of Force-Tactics Directive, Dog Encounters, Directive No. 7.1, September 2014).

Based off the comments of the radio call and Officers Chamu's interview of Zeledon and Ignacio, the officers were made aware that the dogs were vicious and had previously attempted to bite others. To verify that the dogs were still at the location, Officer Love El ran her side handle baton along the iron fence, creating a loud noise. Upon observing the dogs emerge from the northeast side of the property, Officer Love El continued to move her baton along the fence, creating additional loud noises. Neither Officers Chamu nor Love El communicated their plans

for redeployment or how they would handle the incident. Officer Chamu attempted to calm the dogs down by sticking her hand through the fence, so the dogs could smell her scent. As the dogs ran northbound through the front yard, Officers Chamu and Love El tapped on the iron fence with their hands, creating additional disturbances for the dogs. After perceiving the dogs were contained in the yard with no community members in danger, Officers Chamu and Love El walked northbound on the sidewalk. Officer Chamu and Officer Love El observed an opening in the fence. Instead of redeploying to a safer location, Officer Chamu stopped at the opening of the fence and stuck her hand towards the dogs. The dogs exited through the iron fence and lunged at Officer Chamu.

Officers Chamu and Love El had sufficient time to develop a tactical plan, discuss effective tools when encountering dogs, and there was no urgent need to make contact with the dogs. In this case, instead of allowing the appropriate resources, such as Los Angeles Animal Services, to handle the dogs, Officers Chamu and Love El took it upon themselves to make contact with the dogs without having a tactical plan or communicating their intentions with each other.

The Chair of the UOFRB noted that in analyzing this incident, there were a series of missteps and a sense of complacency by the officers throughout the incident that caused the Chair to be concerned, which ultimately culminated in an OIS. The totality of the circumstances of this OIS were taken into consideration as to the reasonableness of the officers' actions, as well as the uncertainties that exist when responding to radio calls for service which a patrol officer can encounter. An officer's main concern upon arriving at the scene of a call is safety. I would have preferred Officers Chamu and Love El had developed a more robust plan prior to their arrival and had all of their necessary equipment with them. I would have preferred Officers Chamu and Love El had an open conversation with each other throughout the entirety of this incident and functioned as a team in dealing with the threat the dogs presented. Furthermore, I would have preferred that Officers Chamu and Love El actions adhered to the guidelines for encounters with dogs and not have initiated contact with the dogs who were contained at the location.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Chair of the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officers Chamu and Love El's failure to adhere to the Department protocols with regard to encounters with dogs were a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that these issues be topics of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 3 Tactical Planning/Tactical Communication (Substantial Deviation, without justification – Officers Chamu and Love El)

Officers are trained to work together and function as a team. In order to ensure officer safety and help ensure an appropriate outcome, the primary officers and cover officers must effectively communicate with one another. Appropriate communication involves advising the primary officer of any critical occurrences or safety issues (California Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training Learning, Domain No. 22).

Officers must approach every contact with officer safety in mind. Complacency, overconfidence, poor planning, or inappropriate positioning can leave officers vulnerable to attack (California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Learning Domain 21).

Operational success is based on the ability of officers to effectively communicate during critical incidents. Officers, when faced with a tactical incident, improve their overall safety by their ability to recognize an unsafe situation and work collectively to ensure a successful resolution.

Officers Chamu and Love El were aware that the dogs were vicious and had attempted to bite Guillermo based off the comments of the radio call and the conversations with witnesses Ignacio and Zeledon. However, Officers Chamu and Love El did not communicate or formulate a plan on their intended actions on how they would handle the dogs after receiving this information and while making initial contact with the dogs in the yard.

Officer Chamu conversed with Zeledon in Spanish; however, Officer Chamu did not advise Officer Love El, who was not a Spanish speaker, that Zeledon described the dogs as being vicious and that the dogs had attacked Ignacio's son previously. Prior to attempting to make contact with the dogs, Officers Chamu's limited plan consisted of making contact with the dogs' owner to have them control the dogs and remove the dogs from the neighbor's property. However, Officer Chamu did not communicate her plan to Officer Love El. Once Officers Chamu and Love El verified that the dogs were at the location, both officers continued to create noises to maintain sight of the dogs but did not communicate their further intentions or a specific plan, but rather made assumptions of what they would be doing to resolve the incident. Officers Chamu and Love El followed Zeledon assuming they were going to attempt to make contact with the dogs' owner but did not discuss this intention with each other or with Zeledon. Additionally, Officers Chamu and Love El did not consider requesting any additional resources and dismissed utilizing the tools that were available to them, such as a fire extinguisher. Officers Chamu and Love El observed that the dogs were in the yard; however, they intensified the situation by further disturbing the dogs after the initial contact, rather than allowing the dogs to remain contained and ensuring the safety of others through communication with the witnesses and impacted residents where the dogs were contained. Officer Chamu acknowledged that the dogs appeared upset when she contacted the dogs at the fence opening. Officers Love El and Chamu placed themselves at a tactical disadvantage and in an unsafe location near the opening of the iron fence and endangered the pedestrians in the area by continuing to entice the dogs towards the fence.

In this case, Officers Chamu and Love El had time to communicate and formulate a tactical while enroute to the radio call and also upon their arrival once they verified that the dogs were on the premises. In addition, as part of their planning process Officers Chamu and Love El did not have all their required equipment when they exited their police vehicle and dismissed the use of a fire extinguisher, believing it would not be needed in this incident, and disregarded other tools, such as a baton or OC spray. Furthermore, officers are expected to work together and communicate, strategize, and operate as a team while confronting incidents. Officers Chamu and

Love El's lack of communication with each other, as well as Officer Chamu placing her hand through the fence opening to calm the "upset" dogs was deliberated with great concern.

The Chair of the UOFRB concluded that in analyzing this incident, it was not one deviation, but a series of missteps throughout the entire incident that caused concern. The totality of the circumstances of this OIS were taken into consideration as to the reasonableness, as well as the uncertainty of this encounter due to lack of communication and planning, and overall complacency exhibited by Officers Chamu and Love El. I would have preferred Officers Chamu and Love El had developed and discussed a detailed plan and had all of their necessary equipment with them prior to their start of watch and during this incident in order to work towards reducing the intensity of this encounter. Furthermore, I would have preferred that Officers Chamu and Love El had an open conversation with each other throughout the entirety of the incident and functioned more as a team in dealing with the threat the dogs presented.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Chair of the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officers Chamu and Love El's lack of planning and communication were a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that these issues be topics of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Additional Tactical Debrief Topics

Situational Awareness (Safety of Civilians) – Officers Chamu and Love El followed Zeledon who was walking north on the sidewalk. As the dogs exited the fence and lunged towards Officer Chamu, both officers unholstered their service pistols. Officers Chamu and Love El did not advise Zeledon to move to a safe location until after the OIS had concluded. The aggressive behavior of the dogs presented a significant concern for the safety of the community, as well as the officers. Officers Chamu and Love El are reminded to warn community members of the existence of potential hazards and advise the community to seek a safe location. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Retention of Equipment – Officer Love El walked northbound on the sidewalk of Wilmington Avenue and held her side handle baton in her left hand. When Officer Love El observed the dogs close distance to Officer Chamu, Officer Love El transitioned her baton to her right hand by the long, extended portion of the baton. Officer Love El briefly held her baton in a two-handed grip prior to attempting to secure the baton. Unable to secure her baton in her baton ring, Officer Love El dropped her baton onto the ground and unholstered her service pistol. Officer Love El is reminded of the importance of effectively securing her equipment so it can be readily available to her if needed and to also prevent the equipment from becoming a hazard or utilized as a weapon by others. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Command and Control

Command and Control is the use of active leadership to direct others while using available resources to coordinate a response, accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Command uses active leadership to establish order, provide stability and structure, set objectives and create

conditions under which the function of control can be achieved with minimal risk. Control implements the plan of action while continuously assessing the situation, making necessary adjustments, managing resources, managing the scope of the incident (containment), and evaluating whether existing Department protocols apply to the incident.

Command and Control is a process where designated personnel use active leadership to command others while using available resources to accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Active leadership provides clear, concise, and unambiguous communication to develop and implement a plan, direct personnel and manage resources. The senior officer or any person on scene who has gained sufficient situational awareness shall initiate Command and Control and develop a plan of action. Command and Control will provide direction, help manage resources, and make it possible to achieve the desired outcome. Early considerations of PATROL will assist with the Command and Control process (LAPD, Training Bulletin, Volume XLVII Issue 4, July 2018).

Incident Commander (IC) – In accordance with Department Policy, the IC sets the objectives, the strategy and directs the tactical response. Directing the tactical response means applying tactics appropriate to the strategy, assigning the right resources and monitoring performance (Supervisor's Field Operations Guide, Volume 2, LAPD Emergency Operations Guide).

Sergeant Giargiari was the first supervisor at scene and identified himself as the Incident Commander. Sergeant Giargiari was the only Southeast Patrol Division supervisor available at the time of the incident. Sergeant Giargiari identified Officers Chamu and Love El as being involved in the incident. Sergeant Giargiari informed Sergeant Cohen that Officer Chamu was being transported to the hospital and a supervisor was needed for Officer Chamu. Sergeant Giargiari did not advise Officer Chamu or Officer Love El not to discuss the incident. Sergeant Giargiari did not obtain a PSS from Officers Chamu or Love El; however, Sergeant Giargiari's BWV captured him discussing the incident with Officer Love El. According to Sergeant Giargiari, Sergeant Cohen advised him Sergeant Hale would respond to assist with the PSS, separation, and monitoring of Officers Love El and Chamu. Sergeant Giargiari monitored Officer Love El while also managing the incident but walked away from the OIS scene to his police vehicle, leaving Officer Love El unmonitored for approximately two and a half minutes. After the officers secured the fence opening within the area of the OIS, Sergeant Giargiari allowed officers to remain in the immediate area where evidence was present.

The Chair of the UOFRB considered that this incident was Sergeant Giargiari's first Categorical Use of Force incident handled as a supervisor; however, the Chair of the UOFRB identified multiple concerns where there was room for improvement. In this case, Sergeant Giargiari's actions were not consistent with Department supervisory training and did not meet my expectations of a field supervisor during a critical incident.

Sergeant Cohen requested a 77th Street Patrol Division supervisor to respond to the hospital to monitor Officer Chamu because there were no supervisors available in Southeast Patrol Division.

Sergeant Hale arrived at scene, obtained a PSS from Officer Love El, and admonished her not to speak about the incident.

Sergeant Baumann responded to the hospital and transported Officer Chamu to Southeast CPS where Sergeant Cohen obtained a PSS.

Sergeant Taylor monitored and transported Officer Chamu to the OIS scene to meet with FID personnel and returned Officer Chamu to Southeast CPS.

The actions of Sergeants Hale, Baumann, Cohen, and Taylor were consistent with Department supervisory training and met my expectations of field supervisors during a critical incident.

Tactical Debrief

In conducting an objective assessment of this case, the Chair of the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officers Chamu and Love El's actions were a substantial deviation, without justification, from Department policy and tactical training, thus requiring a finding of Administrative Disapproval.

Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were identified areas where improvement could be made. A Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for involved personnel to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident.

Therefore, I will direct Officers Chamu and Love El to attend a Tactical Debrief that shall include discussions pertaining to the above Debriefing Topics along with the following mandatory topics:

- Use of Force Policy;
- Equipment Required/Maintained;
- Tactical Planning;
- Radio and Tactical Communication (including Code Six);
- Tactical De-Escalation;
- Command and Control; and,
- Lethal Force.

General Training Update (GTU)

On March 19, 2019, Officer Chamu attended a GTU. All mandatory topics were covered including Animal Encounters.

Drawing/Exhibiting

Department policy relative to drawing and exhibiting a firearm is: *"An officer's decision to draw or exhibit a firearm should be based on the tactical situation and the officer's reasonable belief there is a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where*

deadly force may be justified" (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No. 1, Section 556.80).

Officer Chamu (First Occurrence)

According to Officer Chamu, when both dogs exited the fence and charged her, she backed away from the dogs approximately three to four steps onto the dirt parkway. The white dog began to bark and jumped up, attempting to bite Officer Chamu's right hand, but did not "really catch" her hand. Officer Chamu attempted to "shoo them away," but the brown dog approached on her left side, jumped, and grabbed a hold of Officer Chamu, biting Officer Chamu's left leg. Officer Chamu described the bite as, "he kind of bit and let go." Officer Chamu stated she realized the dogs were trying to attack her. Officer Chamu drew out her service pistol and aimed down towards the dog's face because she believed if she did not shoot at the dog, the dog would "tear a piece of her body away."

Officer Chamu recalled,

I originally saw the dogs charging at me, and I yelled at them hoping that they would retreat, because my intention was not to harm them. But as soon as I saw them jumping at me, I unholstered my pistol, because one had already jumped up at me to attack me.¹⁹

It must have been approximately three, four steps before I -- before I stepped onto the dirt. Because it was a small sidewalk and small dirt before I was backed into a vehicle and the tree on my right-hand side.²⁰

As the dogs started approaching me and I saw them charging at me, I started to back up, but there wasn't any cover. It was just a tree that was to my right rear side and there was a vehicle right behind me, so I kind of was cornered in as I tried to back up. I stepped off the sidewalk into the dirt when the dog still kept coming at me. There was a white one that jumped on my right-hand side and a little brown one that jumped to my left. They kind of just triangulated me. And the left one -- the dog on the left was the one that actually bit me.²¹

One of the dogs I jumped up at me, but it didn't really catch my hand. At that moment I tried to shoo them away, but one -- the second dog approached me from the left side and he jumped up and grabbed ahold of me. So he kind of bit and let go. And I noticed that's when I realized the dogs are actually really trying to attack me. They're not trying to just like shoo me away. So I drew out my firearm, because I knew that at that moment if I don't shoot at the dog, it's going to -- it's going to tear a piece of my body away.²²

¹⁹ Officer Chamu, Page 26, Lines 6-11.

²⁰ Officer Chamu, Page 38, Lines 14-18.

²¹ Officer Chamu, Page 29, Lines 6-17.

²² Officer Chamu, Page 12, Lines 1-12.

*So I aimed towards the short brown dog, because that's the one that actually bit me.*²³

*...it (muzzle) was in a downward motion towards the dog's face, but towards the ground.*²⁴

Officer Chamu (Second Occurrence)

According to the FID Investigation, Officer Chamu briefly holstered her service pistol after picking up Officer Love El's baton; however, when the dogs began to bark and appeared to move towards the fence, Officer Chamu was depicted on Officer Love El's BWV unholstering a second time.

Note: Officer Chamu did not recall holstering and unholstering her service pistol a second time during this incident.

According to Officer Chamu, she advised Officer Love El to seek cover because the dogs had previously attacked Officer Chamu and Officer Chamu believed the dogs were going to attack them. Officers Chamu and Love El returned to their police vehicle for cover.

Officer Chamu recalled,

*I advised my partner to try to get some cover because the dogs were actually going to attack and they actually did attack me. So we went back to the vehicle and it was probably like the only decent cover we had away from the dogs. I holstered my firearm when other units started arriving.*²⁵

Officer Love El

According to Officer Love El, she unholstered her service pistol because she was ready to fire at the dogs and believed the situation had gotten to the point where deadly force may be justified. Officer Love El heard Officer Chamu give commands to the dogs, stating "Get back." Officer Love El observed the dogs jumping up and Officer Chamu kicking. Officer Love El stated she did not want to shoot Officer Chamu's leg or foot but did not want the dogs to puncture Officer Chamu. Officer Love El believed she had a "good shot," but assessed that the brown dog was too close to Officer Chamu. Officer Love El repeatedly placed her finger on and off the trigger as she assessed her ability to safely discharge her service pistol. Officer Love El heard Officer Chamu's shot and observed the dogs run northbound. The dogs lingered and then went back in the gate.

²³ Officer Chamu, Page 26, Line 25, and Page 27, Line 1.

²⁴ Officer Chamu, Page 28, Lines 11-13.

²⁵ Officer Chamu, Page 13, Lines 2-7.

Officer Love El recalled,

So as I unholster, I come out and I'm going from one to four because I'm ready to fire at the dog. I'm ready to fire at the dogs, because I'm seeing them keep coming. They're not -- she's giving them commands. She's saying, "Get back. You better get back." My partner unholstered. I'm like okay. I have to fire at this dog.²⁶

So the reason I unholstered was because this situation can -- the situation can go to the point where deadly force may be justified. And it was also to the point whereas I didn't -- the dogs was coming at her so much and I didn't see that -- I didn't know whether or not they were going to bite her, whether or not they had bitten her. But I didn't want her to be at a point where she's at a disadvantage where she actually got bit and she was injured or it was something that was -- that was going to puncture her or defame her in any way or her body. So that's why I unholstered.²⁷

Because at that point the dog was coming -- the way he as coming at my partner, I didn't want it to get to the point whereas my partner went down and they maul her face or they maul her neck or anything like that. So I wanted to try to de-escalate that situation as best as I could from a tactical advantage. And I felt like the lethal was the only thing.²⁸

But the dog kept jumping up and jumping back and jumping up and jumping back. So as he's doing that, my partner's leg is right there. So my partner is kind of like kicking. So I was like I don't want to shoot my partner's leg or her foot, but the dog is coming up and coming back. So it's kind of like from what I was seeing, I'm like okay -- okay. I have it. I don't have it. I have it. I don't have it.²⁹

I kept putting it on and taking it on and putting it on and taking it off, because I was trying to figure out if I had that shot. From what I recall is do I have this shot? Like my partner's leg is right here. The dog is backing up and forth. Is it -- can I -- is it there? Is it on it? Is it not? Is it on it? Is it not? So I was kind of on and off.³⁰

I mean like I have a good shot as in I can get them to make sure that his leg isn't on her where her leg might be in the way of -- or her leg might get injured from my bullet and I didn't have him. I was like, oh, wait. He is too close to my partner's legs.³¹

In this case, the Chair of the UOFRB conducted an evaluation of the reasonableness of Officers Chamu and Love El's Drawing/Exhibiting. The Chair of the UOFRB noted that Officers Chamu and Love El initially responded to a radio call of aggressive dogs who were not allowing residents to enter their property. The incident escalated when the two dogs exited the gap in the

²⁶ Officer Love El, Page 14, Lines 2-8.

²⁷ Officer Love El, Page 30, Lines 12-24.

²⁸ Officer Love El, Page 46, Lines 20-25, Page 47, Lines 1-2.

²⁹ Officer Love El, Page 14, Lines 9-15.

³⁰ Officer Love El, Page 36, Lines 17-23.

³¹ Officer Love El, Page 14, Lines 17-21.

fence, lunged at Officer Chamu, and a dog bit Officer Chamu twice. In fear for her safety and believing the dogs were attempting to bite her again, Officer Chamu drew her service pistol to prevent the imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death.

After observing the dogs continuously jump towards Officer Chamu and attempt to bite Officer Chamu, Officer Love El drew her service pistol in fear that Officer Chamu could be seriously injured by the dogs. Officer Love El drew her service pistol to protect Officer Chamu from the imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Chair of the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers Chamu and Love El, while faced with similar circumstances, would reasonably believe that there was a substantial risk the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

Therefore, I find Officers Chamu and Love El's Drawing/Exhibiting to be In-Policy, No Further Action.

Policy on the Use of Force

Use of De-Escalation Techniques³²

It is the policy of this Department that, whenever practicable, officers shall use techniques and tools consistent with Department de-escalation training to reduce the intensity of any encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.

Factors Used to Determine Objective Reasonableness³³

The Department examines reasonableness using Graham v. Connor and the articulated facts from the perspective of a Los Angeles Police Officer with similar training and experience, in the same situation, based on the totality of the circumstances.

In determining the appropriate level of force, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of facts and circumstances of each particular case. Those factors may include, but are not limited to:

- *The feasibility of using de-escalation tactics;*
- *The seriousness of the crime or suspected offense;*
- *The level of threat or resistance presented by the subject;*
- *Whether the subject was posing an immediate threat to officers or a danger to the community;*

³² Office of the Chief of Police (OCOP), Special Order No. 4, "Policy on the Use of Force - Revised," was adopted by the Department on February 5, 2020 and amended LAPD Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10.

³³ Office of the Chief of Police (OCOP), Special Order No. 4, "Policy on the Use of Force - Revised," was adopted by the Department on February 5, 2020 and amended LAPD Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10.

- *The potential for injury to citizens, officers or subjects;*
- *The risk or apparent attempt by the subject to escape;*
- *The conduct of the subject being confronted (as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time);*
- *The amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the officer had to determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be reasonable;*
- *The availability of other resources;*
- *The training and experience of the officer;*
- *The proximity or access of weapons to the subject;*
- *Officer versus subject factors such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion and number officers versus subjects; and,*
- *The environmental factors and/or other exigent circumstances.*

Use of Force – Deadly³⁴

It is the policy of this Department that deadly force shall be used only when necessary in defense of human life. Specifically, deadly force shall be used only to:

- *To defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to another person; or*
- *To apprehend a fleeing person for any felony that threatened or resulted in death or serious bodily injury, if the officer reasonably believes that the person will cause death or serious bodily injury to another unless immediately apprehended. Where feasible, a peace officer shall, prior to the use of force, make reasonable efforts to identify themselves as a peace officer and to warn that deadly force may be used, unless the officer has objectively reasonable grounds to believe the person is aware of those facts.*

In determining whether deadly force is necessary, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of the particular circumstances of each case and shall use other available resources and techniques if reasonably safe and feasible.

Note: *Because the application of deadly force is limited to the above scenarios, an officer shall not use deadly force against a person based on the danger that person poses to themselves, if an objectively reasonable officer would believe the person does not pose an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person.*

³⁴ Office of the Chief of Police (OCOP), Special Order No. 4, "Policy on the Use of Force - Revised," was adopted by the Department on February 5, 2020 and amended LAPD Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10.

The Department's Evaluation of Deadly Force³⁵

The Department will analyze an officer's use of deadly force by evaluating the totality of the circumstances of each case consistent with the California Penal Code Section 835(a), as well as the factors articulated in Graham v. Connor.

Dog Shooting

The size and speed of an animal can increase the potential of a missed shot and the possibility of an officer or bystander being critically injured by a bullet intended for the dog. An officer is authorized the use of lethal force when it's reasonable to protect him/herself or other person(s) from immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury. Consideration should be given to the background and the possibility of a ricochet. The primary target is the body mass. Officers may not use lethal force against a dog to protect property, including other animals (Los Angeles Police Department Use of Force-Tactics Directive No. 7.1, Dog Encounters, September 2014).

Officer Chamu – 9mm, one round, in a downward direction, impacting the dirt parkway.

According to Officer Chamu, she felt another bite and discharged one round at the brown dog on her left-hand side because Officer Chamu believed that the dog “would bite my leg off” and “bite off an artery.” Officer Chamu stated that she believed she would “be bleeding out right now.” Officer Chamu believed that she would have been “getting stitches at the very minimum.” Officer Chamu aimed towards the short brown dog’s face and decided she was not going to take the time to aim for the dog’s chest or leg because the dog had jumped at her twice. After Officer Chamu discharged a round, both dogs backed away.

Officer Chamu recalled,

I just tried to shoot at the dog to stop him from biting me.³⁶

And I knew that if I did not stop, that dog from -- one of the dogs from actually harming me -- I actually would have been, you know, missing a limb or something. He actually did bite me and he did break through my skin. That's when I fired one shot at one of the dogs when they immediately took off.³⁷

I wanted to stop the dog from biting me and if -- I wasn't going to take time to try to see and aim for maybe the chest or a leg. The dog was biting me, so I had to stop that dog, and I aimed towards the dog's face.³⁸

³⁵ Office of the Chief of Police (OCOP), Special Order No. 4, “Policy on the Use of Force - Revised,” was adopted by the Department on February 5, 2020 and amended LAPD Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10.

³⁶ Officer Chamu, Page 30, Line 4-5.

³⁷ Officer Chamu, Page 26, Lines 12-17.

³⁸ Officer Chamu, Page 27, Lines 12-15.

At that moment I did not have enough options. I didn't have any cover. All I had was my firearm to basically stop what I had in front of me was a dog charging at me. And if I didn't shoot at least to stop the dog, then he would bite my leg off. He would actually either bite off an artery and I'd be bleeding out right now or he'd be taking a chunk out where I'd be getting stitches at the very minimum.³⁹

Immediately after I fired that one round, both dogs immediately -- they backed off and they attempted to gain entry back inside the fence. They got completely away from me. They stopped attacking and they went towards the direction of the residence where they had actually exited from.⁴⁰

My initial target was the brown dog, but I also -- I was also looking at the dog that was on my right because that one also jumped up at me -- jumped up at me first, but the one that actually made contact was the brown -- the short brown dog. So I aimed towards the short brown dog, because that's the one that actually bit me. And I think he had bit me twice by then before I shot the round.⁴¹

I wanted to stop the dog from biting me and if -- I wasn't going to take time to try to see and aim for maybe the chest or a leg. The dog was biting me, so I had to stop that dog, and I aimed towards the dog's face.⁴²

When I discharged the firearm, the dog was jumping up -- both dogs were jumping up. But the one on my left had already bit me, so I believe that was my initial threat. And he already bit me twice, so I aimed towards him -- most definitely towards him first because he was the one that was actually attacking me.⁴³

Background – As the dogs lunged towards Officer Chamu, Officer Chamu unholstered her service pistol and pointed it in a downward direction towards the dirt parkway. The FID investigation revealed that Officer Chamu fired one round, which missed the brown dog, and struck the dirt parkway to the left of the brown dog. FID investigators were not able to locate an impact at scene, a fired bullet or a bullet fragment; however, one expended bullet casing was recovered on the dirt parkway in front of 10618 Wilmington Avenue.

The Chair of the UOFRB conducted a thorough review in evaluating the circumstances and evidence related to this OIS. The Chair of the UOFRB noted that Officer Chamu was aware that the dogs were vicious and had previously attempted to bite someone, but disregarded that information and based her assumptions of the incident on her prior experience with dogs. Officer Chamu acknowledged that the dogs appeared upset when she stood at the fence and did not appropriately assess the seriousness of the threat the dogs presented to her and others. Officer Chamu walked to the fence and enticed the dogs to approach her. Officer Chamu

³⁹ Officer Chamu, Page 40, Lines 14-22.

⁴⁰ Officer Chamu, Page 38, Lines 4-9.

⁴¹ Officer Chamu, Page 26, Lines 20-25, Page 27, Lines 1-2.

⁴² Officer Chamu, Page 27, Lines 12-16.

⁴³ Officer Chamu, Page 27, Lines 20-25, Page 28, Line 1.

unnecessarily placed herself in a tactically unsafe position when she stood next to the opening in the iron fence while reaching her hand towards the dogs. After being advised by Officer Love El that the dogs “might be able to get out of there,” Officer Chamu remained at the opening of the fence in an unwarranted confidence and responded to Officer Love El that she was “trying to get the chain.” As both dogs quickly exited the fence and aggressively lunged towards Officer Chamu, Officer Chamu redeployed away from the dog, but did not communicate to her partner or consider her other options. Due to poor planning and not having additional tools in her possession for encountering vicious dogs, Officer Chamu’s options to protect herself and others were limited and ultimately resulted in her utilization of lethal force.

I recognize that Officer Chamu was bitten during this incident. Officer Chamu did sustain two bite marks to the front of her left leg, below her knee. Officer Chamu was treated for dog bites she sustained to the left lower leg, including a skin avulsion to the left shin. Although Officer Chamu had sustained an injury from the dogs, I also considered both the circumstances that involved Officer Chamu and her partner, along with the tactical decision making process which lead up to the OIS. An officer acting in a manner consistent with Department guidelines for handling Dog Encounters would have been cognizant that the two dogs posed a threat and that approaching the dogs would have further escalated the incident. I would have preferred that Officer Chamu not have made contact with the dogs after being notified the dogs were vicious and had previously attempted to bite another person. Lacking any exigent circumstances which may have caused Officer Chamu to make contact with the dogs, Officer Chamu should have better utilized her time to ensure containment of the dogs for her, her partner, and the community’s safety until the appropriate resources, such as the Department of Animal Services, had arrived. Officer Chamu committed a series of deficient decisions which greatly contributed to her significant tactical disadvantage. These decisions, along with Officer Chamu’s unjustified deviations from Department training, with regard to tactics and de-escalation, resulted in the OIS.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Chair of the UOFRB determined, and I concur, these decisions were not reasonable and placed Officer Chamu in avoidable circumstances, which rendered the use of deadly force by Officer Chamu unreasonable. Therefore, I find Officer Chamu’s Use of Lethal Force to be Out of Policy, Administrative Disapproval.

Additional/Equipment

Required Equipment – Officer Chamu left her baton and her Hobble Restraint Device (HRD) inside of the police vehicle at the time of the incident. Officer Love El left her HRD in the police vehicle at the time of the incident. These issues were brought to the attention of Captain L. Paglialonga, Serial No. 30329, Commanding Officer, Southeast Patrol Division, who advised that these issues were addressed through divisional training and the generation of a Supervisory Action Item (SAI) for each officer. The Commanding Officer of Operations – South Bureau (OSB) and the Director of the Office of Operations (OO) concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Body Worn Video (BWV) Activations – Officer Love El had a late BWV activation. From the point at which Officer Love El parked her police vehicle in front of a liquor store, exited the police vehicle, and joined Officer Chamu and witnesses Icala and Zeledon, 27 seconds had elapsed. Officer Love El did not activate her BWV until after an additional 12 seconds after she had joined her partner and the witnesses. Southeast Area conducted a review and determined that Officer Love El had no prior incidents of late activation of BWV. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Paglialonga who advised that this issue was addressed through divisional training and the generation of a SAI. The Commanding Officer of OSB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

The Office of Operations conducted a random inspection of BWVs associated to Officer Love El, from October 18, 2020 through November 17, 2020, for compliance with BWV policy specific to complete records of investigative or enforcement contacts with the public. The results of the inspection indicated that Officer Love El was in compliance.

Profanity – Officer Chamu utilized profanity immediately preceding and after the OIS. Officer Love El utilized profanity while talking to a witness and after the OIS. These issues were brought to the attention of Captain Paglialonga who advised that these issues were addressed through divisional training and the generation of SAIs. The Commanding Officer of OSB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Communications Division Radio Broadcast Protocols – Officer Chamu broadcast, “Shots fired, officer need help, 10615 Wilmington.” Police Service Representative (PSR) J. Rodriguez, Serial No. N6519, CD, replied, “Roger,” and did not re-broadcast the information. PSR Rodriguez was in training at the time of the incident and was being trained and monitored by PSR III A. Manuel, Serial No. G9198, CD. According to the FID investigation, approximately 50 seconds after the original help broadcast, PSR Manuel initiated an, “Officer needs help,” broadcast, but advised no location was provided, even though a location had been provided by Officer Chamu in the original broadcast.

This was brought to the attention of Captain A. Vargas, Serial No. 30493, Commanding Officer, Communications Division, who advised that this issue was addressed through the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet for PSR Manuel. The Commanding Officer of Administrative Services Bureau (ASB) and the Director of the Office of Support Services (OSS) concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Protocols Subsequent to a Categorical Use of Force – Sergeant Giargiari did not obtain a PSS at scene from Officers Chamu or Love El; however, Sergeant Giargiari’s BWV captured him discussing the incident with Officer Love El. Sergeant Giargiari did not advise Officer Chamu or Love El not to discuss the incident because Officer Chamu was being transported to the hospital. Sergeant Giargiari believed the transport created separation between Officer Chamu and Officer Love El. While Officer Chamu was inside the rescue RA with the rear doors open, Sergeant Giargiari’s BWV captured multiple officers going to the rear of the RA and appear to

engage in a conversation with Officer Chamu. In addition, Sergeant Giargiari walked away from the OIS scene for approximately two and a half minutes and left Officer Love El unmonitored.

After officers secured the opening of the fence within the area of the OIS, Sergeant Giargiari allowed officers to remain in the immediate area where evidence was present, thus allowing for the possibility of officers unintentionally altering the crime scene. These issues were brought to the attention of Captain Paglialonga. As a result, Sergeant Giargiari was issued an Employee Comment Sheet for not preserving the crime scene. Sergeant Giargiari was issued a Notice To Correct Deficiencies (NTCD) for not obtaining a PSS, not admonishing Officers Love El and Chamu not to discuss the incident, and for failing to separate and monitor Officer Love El. In addition, all of these issues were also addressed with Sergeant Giargiari through divisional training and the generation of a SAI.

Sergeant's Daily Report – Sergeant Baumann's report did not properly document who she relinquished the monitoring of Officer Chamu. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain M. Odle, Serial No. 22369, Commanding Officer, 77th Street Patrol Division, who advised that this issue was addressed through divisional training and the generation of a SAI. The Commanding Officer of OSB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Sergeant Taylor's reported times for the transportation of Officer Chamu to the OIS scene and Officer Chamu's return to Southeast CPS did not coincide with the Watch Commander's log. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Paglialonga who advised that this issue was addressed through divisional training, the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet, and the generation of a SAI. The Commanding Officer of OSB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Audio/Video Recordings

Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS) – Officers Chamu and Love El's police vehicle was equipped with DICVS at the time of the incident; however, their DICVS was not activated due to the officers' Code Two response to the incident.

Body Worn Video (BWV) – All of the officers involved in this incident were equipped with BWV cameras. Officer Chamu's BWV captured the interviews of the witnesses prior to the OIS, as well as movements and audio during the OIS. Officer Love El's BWV captured the interviews of the witnesses prior to the OIS, as well as movements and audio during the OIS.

Outside Video/Surveillance – The FID investigators located video surveillance at a liquor store located at 10624 Wilmington Avenue. The video captured the officers' arrival and initial

The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

Page 31

3.2

encounter with the witnesses. However, due to the distance and a tree blocking the view of the camera, the video did not capture the OIS.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'MR. MOORE', written over the printed name.



MICHEL R. MOORE
Chief of Police

Date: 12-4-20

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD REPORT

INC No. 008-20	CF No.	DR No.
OIS - Animal (Dog)		

REVIEW BOARD INFORMATION

Location of Incident 10618 Wilmington Avenue, Los Angeles	RD 1838	Date of Incident March 08, 2020	Date and Time of Board Review November 09, 2020 1530 Hours
Chair Assistant Chief B. Girmala, Serial No. 24916	Signature of Approving Board Members:  24916		
Member (Office Representative)			
Member (Police Sciences and Training Bureau)			
Member (Bureau)			
Member (Peer)			
Presenting Commanding Officer			
Notes:			
Additional Considerations:			
Modification to Present Policy, Practices or Training:			
<div style="text-align: right;">  <div style="writing-mode: vertical-rl; transform: rotate(180deg);"> RECEIVED POLICE COMMISSION 2020 DEC -4 AM 10:53 </div> </div>			
<div style="text-align: right;"> COP Date Signed: 12/4/20 PC Date Submitted: 12/4/20 </div>			

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Chamu, Wenceslao		Serial No. 43036	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 008-20
Length of Employment 2 years, 9 months	Current Division Southeast		Time in Current Division 0 months, 3 weeks	

Use of Force Review Board	Chief of Police	Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)

Notes: S. TORRES S. TORRES

<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed	Notes:
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***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Love El, Kalekey		Serial No. 43698	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 008-20
Length of Employment 1 year, 6 months	Current Division Wilshire		Time in Current Division 7 Months, 25 Days	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Notes: J. TORRES S. TORRES				
<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed		Notes:		

*A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.